A day of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations

Someone from class told me about an event on campus on Sunday. A day of unofficial discussions between veteran Israeli and Palestinian negotiators.

I reached the venue about 2pm. There were a dozen people watching a video feed into the conference room. A mixture of middle aged and young.

When I arrived the moderator was having the Israeli representatives describe the route of the ‘separation barrier’ and explain section by section why it didn’t follow the 1967 ‘Green Line'. This was in order to connect adjacent Israeli settlements with the main body of Israel. The Israeli’s pointed out, however, that all the settlements have ‘separation barriers’ around them already.

Let me introduce the guys. Meet General Shlomo Brom, Deputy National Security Advisor to Ehud Barak and former Director of the Strategic Planning Bureau, Israeli Defence Force General Staff. Very measured manner, unlikely black hair, mildly aggressive sense of humour. His younger colleague, Reserve Colonel Shauli Arieli, a veteran of Geneva Accords and the Camp David negotiations: taller, shaven headed, lets Shlomo make the running. Meet Hussein Agha, advisor to the Palestinian Authority (PA), analyst, writer, academic. No, not glasses and smart casual: that would be Edward Said. Hussein was more of a rough-and-ready figure, light blue polo shirt unbuttoned and untucked, last shaved yesterday or the day before, robust sense of humour, passionate but able to bridle his passion. His colleague Dr Ahmad Khalidi, also an adviser, academic and writer, had a more serious manner but, even after a long day, tireless in picking up detailed points and keeping his remarks remorseless on topic. The supporting cast included Dr Claire Spencer, Head of the Middle East Programme, Chatham House occasional interjecting remarks for clarification or procedure and her colleague Professor Yossi Mekelberg, improbably young.

I was amazed as the Israelis happily reeled off their statistics about how the wall will now only annexe (my word) 5% (or 6 or 6.5%) of the West Bank into Israel proper, down from 9%. What a deal! My Palestinian boys are unflinching. (My mate Sami would have gone through the roof! YOU ALREADY TOOK 80%! NOW YOU TAKE 5% MORE AND CALL THAT A COMPROMISE! AND IT’S A PARTICULAR 5%. WHAT ABOUT CONTROL OF THE WATER!) Dr Ahmad and Hussein are unfazed. They only make notes and seek clarification: what about Jerusalem…

They need to keep their cool. There is more provocation coming. General Shlomo drops in his opinion that Ariel Sharon is a ‘good man’. Isn’t he is a Palestinian bête noire?, if so, Ahmad and Hussein don’t rise to the bait. “The Israelis would like to negotiate, but they don’t have a partner.” Another barb from General Shlomo. Nothing, not a flicker. These guys have had it all before. They don’t even bother to suggest that Israel and the US have done everything they can to undermine any potential Palestinian ‘partner’ that really represents Palestinian opinion. I am unclear as to whether General Shlomo does this to express stereotypical Israeli opinions that will have to be appeased, or, as I fear, does it almost unconsciously as an expression of institutional disdain. I say this because, under the guise of a joke, he also calls his opposite number ‘Corporal Agha'. Agha, a Senior Associate Member of St Antony's College Oxfored, does not appreciate the joke, but swallows his reaction. Of course, many would agree with Gen Shlomo’s viewpoints; think he’s being reasonable. In a tea-break I talk about things with a Israeli-born former South African. To him the Palestinians have succeeded in hijacking the ‘left-wing’ media to their cause. European liberals have been fooled by Palestinian propaganda into thinking Israel is the aggressor. What can I say? They’ve fooled me.

The stated aim of the daytime session was to come up with a statement of things that the two sides could agree on. Not an ‘agreement’. Simply facts, descriptions of the situation, possible approaches to a next step could they agree on. Much reference to Track II negotiations, being jargon for unofficial discussions used to find ways towards frameworks for formal Track I negotiations.

Here are my notes on the ideas floated, concepts raised. Not so much cut and thrust, but feint and counter-feint.

Dr Ahmad: at present Israeli and Palestinians positions are not on a course for convergence; Palestinians are taking a harder line. This is partly because, as internal conflicts reign in Gaza/West Bank (GWB), the Palestinians living outside the GWB are starting to assert themselves more. They have a greater stake in the details of a final settlement especially the right of return. The centre of gravity of Palestinian nationalism may move ‘outside’ again, as it was before the return of Arafat. Encouraged by the Geneva Initiative, did I hear him say? ( www.geneva-accord.org). All bets are off: 2 states, 1 state, no states… popular talk about dissolving the Palestinian Authority.

Gen Shlomo counters this by contrasting ‘process’ and ‘mood’. This reaction is just ‘mood’, easily influenced. What matters is process. The Palestinians need to put their house in order. Hamas are religious, but Fatah, the secular party, de facto accept the two-state solution. They need to stop encouraging violence. The best way forward to ‘real negotiations’ is to threaten the Palestinians with more violence. (I paraphrase.)

Hussein says he agrees with Gen Shlomo (?!), in as much as a unilateral approach is called for. Because there is no appetite for broad bi-lateral agreements on either side, it is up to each side’s leadership to initiate unilateral, single-issue measures in order to change the climate. Hamas should declare a ceasefire; Israel should pull back from some positions in the West Bank (to 28/9/2000 line?); prisoner exchange. Ahmad concurs: intermediate steps, rolling process on ground, create an environment for ‘final status’ talks.

Col. Arieli strikes a different note in this diplomatic jam session: ‘In the meanwhile we should be putting pressure on the Palestinian government.’

The problem, it is suggested is that while Israel is institutionally capable of delivering on agreements once made, the Palestinian authorities are not. A debate starts about eventually having a Palestinian referendum to ‘seal the deal’. Hussain points out that, on the Palestinian side, the minority in a 51% to 49% referendum would not accept the outcome. To secure the agreement of a bare majority of Palestinians is inadequate.

General Shlomo says that before trying to make progress on the ground, as suggested by Hussein, they should ‘share an ultimate vision’. (Is this code for: we can live with the current situation, unless you agree to a final deal that we find acceptable, we are not going to relax our position?)

By way of diversion we now move to discuss Syria. Formerly it was the conventional wisdom that the Israeli polity could not handle two negotiation processes at once and that the Palestinian situation should come first. Shlomo said that now the US had lifted its ‘veto’, the way was now open to negotiation. It was so hard, though, for the Israeli public to accept the surrender of the Golan Heights. Hussain agrees that the time was right to bring in Syria. He says that a deal with Syria would weaken Hizbollah and Hamas (?) and make them more amenable to negotiation. Hussain repeats a favourite aphorism of his: ‘Hamas may sponsor suicide operations but they are not going to commit organisational suicide’. Dr Ahmad spoils the party by saying that the threat to return the Golan is mobilising the settler activists of the Golan and the West Bank. General Shlomo replies by distinguishing between settler activism, which is a real factor, and the influence which settler activists have on Israeli opinion and policy as a whole, which he thinks is overestimated.

This spins Hussein off into remarking that the US will not allow any agreements without its say so. The US is the biggest obstacle. It is Israel’s responsibility to tell them to accept any deals it wants to make. Shlomo doesn’t gainsay this assertion. Hussain, whom I have definitely warmed to as a personality, goes on to say that prisoner exchange and a ceasefire is in both their interests. There is no need, initially, for a strategic shift, just a mistake-free execution of the mechanics of such a deal. But Israel, as a matter of practicality, has to realise and accept that Hamas is not going to be disarmed. Shlomo kicks in. No ceasefire unless there are guarantees that Hamas will not move missiles into the West Bank. Unilateral moves must be ‘coordinated’. Hussain: get real – Hamas will re-arm ceasefire or no ceasefire. But a ceasefire will help create an environment for a next step. Shlomo: it’s not a happening thing – Israel will never allow missiles that could reach Jerusalem and Tel Aviv to be made or brought into the West Bank. Hussain: The only thing that will prevent it is Hamas self-restraint. Their political judgement. Threats and attacks from Israel won’t work. They may be launching rockets out of Gaza, but there are other more powerful missiles and anti-personnel weapons that they have chosen not to use; they don’t want to escalate at this time.

Another break: a PhD student tells me about how after 1967 there were open borders between Israel and the West Bank. The Israelis spent a lot of development money for the benefit of West Bank Palestinians. Hmm, didn’t know that.

We reconvene for the evening session. The negotiators line up in a panel with the Chairman of Peace Now UK to take questions from the floor. Audience is about fifty or so, a number of whom are evidently members of Peace Now and known to the chairman. The negotiators present on a screen the outcomes of the days ‘negotiation’: things both sides agreed on. There were four. I guess they will be on Peace Now’s website soon. (www.peacenowuk.org) I should have taken better notes, but this is the gist.

1. Final status talks should be deferred until the situation on the ground improves. Final status issues inflame opinion on both sides. Better to take small practical steps.

2. USA does not help by introducing its own ideas of what and who is acceptable and what and who is not. Israel should be left to make its own decisions on these things. The same applies to Europe.

3. Hamas must be allowed to govern. Hamas has been elected and cannot be wished away. It is in Israel’s power to make Gaza and the West Bank ungovernable: they should not be exercising that power.

4. It would be beneficial to the Israeli-Palestinian process for Israel to make progress with Syria.

The evening progresses with questions from the floor, many criticising or questioning the statements proposed as ‘outcomes’. The negotiators have to take a deep breath. It’s been a long day. And now some smart alec who thinks he knows it all and wants to show of a bit tries to throw them a curved ball. They all exhibit great patience as they repeat discussions had during the day for the benefit of those who weren’t there. Basically they all hold their ground and there is little more in terms of information. What about the right of return? We need things to improve on the ground before we can even start to talk about that. What about control of water? Here General Shlomo gives the example of Singapore as a state that has to rely on its neighbour without a problem. No one bothers to challenge the parallel. Someone from the floor says that it seems to them that things only happen when the US knocks heads together. There is a collective sigh. No. US interventions have not been as helpful as it might seem. Col. Shauli describes Dayton as 'problematic', Hussein, as 'idiotic'. Dr Ahmad rapidly ascribes the failures: Oslo - to much focus on confidence building; Camp David - too much focus on a final settlement; Road Map - a muddle of both. A recent Arab proposal was welcomed as a framework to implement a solution, but not a solution in itself. Hussain pushed for unilateral moves; General Shlomoaid the unilateral paradigm was dead.

I try to think of a question I like. Basically I am quite shocked by the way the Israeli’s treat the Palestinians and the way the Palestinians more or less accept it. General Shlomo says Israelis will never accept this or that, meanwhile assuming that the Palestinians will have to put up with whatever the Israelis choose to grant them. As I said it was a mystery to me as to whether General Shlomo really was a supercilious, bullying son-of-a-bitch, or whether he was just trying to represent the typical Israeli man-in-the-street. Talk about asymmetry. It was taken for granted that Israel should have absolute power of the Palestinians now and for ever. General Shlomo wasn’t totally unlikeable and seemed to be trying to be helpful by constantly reasserting Israel’s security demands. I was surprised at one point when he agrees with Hussein that any agreement on freezing settlements was pointless. Some settlements should just be abandoned, he said.

The session ended without my question coming up so I approach Hussain afterwards. “What gives you hope?” I ask. “Despite all the problems and obstacles and failures, here you are negotiating again. So what is it that gives you hope?” Hussain, without a moments hesitation, says “We are not so different the Israelis and us. It is just a difficult situation we find ourselves in, that’s all. We don’t really hate them.” He went on in an animated way and, frankly, it was the most uplifting part of the day. The guy was suddenly telling me that despite everything he had hope. Hope based on fellow feeling for the Israelis. I then found General Shlomo and asked him the same question. He started by giving me a more cerebral reply, saying that he had realised negotiation was not a bargaining process but a process of finding common interests. Then, with more feeling, he said that twenty years ago he had thought the Arabs were devils but, yes, yesterday’s terrorist is today’s negotiating partner.

So, yes, I learned something. As much from the behaviour and banter as from the declarations. Through negotiating the delegates come to know, perhaps respect and perhaps even like each other. Step one. So now between them they need to find approaches they can sell to their respective governments and publics. The rapport they all had was remarkable. They didn’t argue their points, they just carefully corrected any misapprehensions and explained the position as they saw it. An education.